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There is much to admire in this book. It presents its material
clearly, and strikes a good balance between accessibility and
philosophical technicality. There is material included here on
euthanasia, resource allocation, confidentiality, and the nature of
clinical decision making, all of which would be of interest to
health professionals in palliative care.
The introductory chapter sets out a broad picture of the domain
of health care ethics, and unites this with a vision of the aims of
palliative care. Subsequent chapters examine in detail the ethical
significance of different aspects of palliative care, such as the
patient–carer relationship, the relative–patient relationship, infor-
mation giving, and the provision of emotional care. Each chapter
ends with a helpful summary of its main points. The later chapters
presuppose philosophical themes developed in the first, but
otherwise they are largely independent.
Randall and Downie endorse the familiar ‘four principles’
widely regarded as of special importance for examining ethical
problems in health care: beneficence; non-maleficence; respect 
for autonomy; and justice. Unlike some authors who adopt this
approach to health care ethics, Randall and Downie clearly are
alert to the conflicts and inconsistencies inherent in this set of prin-
ciples. For example, a clash between beneficence and respect for
patient autonomy occurs when a health professional seeks to
benefit a patient by administering a particular treatment that the
patient chooses to forego. When general principles collide like
this, the particularities of any given situation determine the relative
weight each one assumes. According to this approach to health
care ethics, there is no absolutely dominant principle, no consis-
tent hierarchy. Additional considerations are often drawn upon in
an effort to establish priorities in specific cases.
To this end, Randall and Downie also briefly consider the
contrast between the ‘four principles’ and the principle of utility –
that one ought to do whatever will maximize the good for the
greatest number of morally relevant beings – though they do not
explore the conceptual difficulties raised by that contrast in this
book. This is a little disappointing, given that they wish to add
utility to their list of principles of health care ethics.
However, for Randall and Downie, ‘the underlying ethical
concern … which is … the controlling moral component in all
palliative care’ (p. 21) is the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, or
practical wisdom. This is a capacity we all have to varying
degrees, and it defies encapsulation in any kind of professional
formalization. Rather, individuals who have developed phronesis
manage to comprehend their accumulated life experience in a
particularly integrated way, such that they can rely on it to form
the basis of sound ethical judgement. Thus phronesis, being
something that, so to speak, emerges from within, cannot be
handed over from one person to another as a simple set of direc-
tives. But the appeal to phronesis introduces another question that
the theoretical core of the book leaves unanswered: for those indi-
viduals who manage successfully to cultivate phronesis and be
guided by it, what use are four, or five or (as in the case of this
book) six principles of health care ethics?
Randall and Downie are happy to take a controversial stance
where they think the weight of argument justifies it. There are two
particular trends in palliative care they take particular issue with –
the tendency to accord supremacy to patient autonomy, and the
delivery of emotional care via the application of professional
counselling and communication skills. In both of these respects
they appear to be swimming against the tide. But the cases made in
favour of their positions are well reasoned and compelling. In the
case of patient autonomy, they correctly point out that this cannot
be the leading ethical principle in palliative care, since it offers no
guidance on the care of non-autonomous patients. They are also
highly critical of consumer preference models of health care;
patients will sometimes demand treatments that clinicians know
will do them more harm than good, and it would be wrong for
clinicians to compromise their commitment to not knowingly
harm their patients.
As to emotional care, they contend that there is no such thing as
professional expertise in this respect. They also maintain that
professional counselling is an inappropriate tool to employ in the
palliative care setting, arguing that formal counselling processes
undermine the ordinary lines of human interaction that are re-
quired for successful emotional care to be delivered.
Randall and Downie’s position on a further controversial topic,
the question of euthanasia, is not entirely clear. They concede that
letting a person die – sometimes called ‘passive euthanasia’ – can
be morally acceptable, because ‘the burdens and risks of
life-prolonging or life-sustaining treatment outweight its benefits’
(p. 123). They also oppose active euthanasia largely on the
grounds that ‘society needs to maintain its prohibition against
killing (murder) in order to protect its members’ (p. 270).
However, they do not make it clear why there is no parallel need
for society to maintain a prohibition against letting people die in
order to protect its members. And if the burdens and risks of life-
prolonging or life-sustaining treatment are sufficient grounds on
which to condone passive euthanasia, some readers will wonder
why this does not provide a similarly compelling reason for recog-
nizing the moral (if not legal) validity of competent requests for
active euthanasia.
They offer something further on this issue in the final chapter of
the book, ‘Quality and value of life’. The argument here is based on
a distinction they introduce between ‘ethics’ and ‘values’. Values,
as defined here, are our subjective preferences, and are hostages to
fashion and whim. Ethics, by contrast, guides our conduct in ways
that have a more consolidated intersubjective, if not universal,
appeal; it is ‘a system of interpersonal rules for the better ordering
of human life’ (p. 304). On the basis of this distinction they claim
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that the value of lives is independent of the question of whether any
given life ought to be brought to a premature end. They hold that
‘no one has a right to do away with a life, or negligently to harm it,
even if it is lacking in value’ (p. 305). Yet the precise way in which
the distinction supports this important conclusion is not worked out
in sufficient detail to be fully persuasive.
In spite of the unexplored philosophical difficulties at its theo-
retical heart, this book does a good job in providing a useful intro-
duction to the application of systematic thinking about ethical
problems facing the members of palliative care teams. Although
written primarily with this group of health professionals in mind,
many others will find that this book has useful things to say about
the ethical dimension of their work. It would make a useful
supplementary text for a variety of courses on health care ethics.
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